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IT security· ·7 min read

Ransomware attack: how a company with 60 employees was working again after 48 hours

Every computer and file share encrypted, but not the backups. How an offline backup brought a company back without paying a ransom, in which order the systems returned and what changed afterwards.

Servers and computers marked with red padlocks, next to a separate data vault from which the data flows back along a line

After a ransomware attack in April 2025, a company with 60 employees was working again after 48 hours. Nobody paid a ransom, and the only work lost was that of the day itself. What saved it was an offline backup the attack never reached. The IT service company looking after the business brought me in. This article covers how the recovery went and what changed afterwards.

How the attack was noticed

Staff noticed the ransomware attack themselves: files would no longer open because they were encrypted. The malware had encrypted every computer that did not have a Cyrillic keyboard layout installed, along with the network shares on the servers. In the end all of the company’s working data was unusable, and a ransom demand came with it.

At this point the IT service company that looks after the business brought me in. In a situation like this, every experienced pair of hands that thinks along and works along helps. I think it is a good decision to get that support early rather than trying to carry everything alone.

Why the offline backup made the difference

Attackers look for backups on purpose, because encrypting them too raises the pressure to pay. Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) describes exactly this approach. In this case the backups were not encrypted. Even so, the recovery did not use the backup on the company’s own network but an offline backup: a copy that goes offline after each backup run, so nothing on the network can delete or encrypt it.

That answered the most important question early on: the data is there. The company did not pay a ransom. All it lost was whatever had been created or changed on the day of the attack. Annoying, but something a business can absorb.

I describe how I set up backups for my own clients today in the article on Proxmox and two-stage backup: a fast local backup and a second copy off site that cannot be changed from the client’s network.

The order of recovery

After an attack you cannot simply restore everything at once. Any system that is back on the network too early can give the attacker a way in again. The recovery therefore went layer by layer:

  1. Firewalls. First, control what goes into and out of the network.
  2. The network without servers or computers. The network components are running again, but nothing that could be infected is connected yet.
  3. Domain controllers. Sign-in, permissions and name resolution depend on them. No other server works properly without them.
  4. The other servers. File storage and applications come back from the backup.
  5. The workstations. Every single one got a complete wipe and a fresh setup.
  6. Printers and other devices. Last, once everything else is back.

This step takes the most time, and that is exactly where the temptation to cut corners is greatest. Just cleaning an encrypted computer is not an option for me. Nobody can say for certain what else the attacker left on it. Setting it up again takes longer, but afterwards the computer is in a known state.

Police, insurer and forensics

Reporting ran alongside the technical work. The company involved the police and its insurer. The insurer arrived on site with its own forensics team. For the recovery this means the forensic and technical work has to be coordinated, and anything the forensics team still wants to examine is not wiped beforehand.

In Germany, every federal state police force has a central cybercrime contact point for businesses (Zentrale Ansprechstelle Cybercrime, ZAC), set up for exactly these cases. If personal data is affected, the GDPR may also require a report to the data protection authority, where feasible within 72 hours. Both should be handled by someone who is not busy restoring servers at the time.

After the ransomware attack: what changed for good

Two measures became permanent afterwards:

Multi-factor sign-in

A stolen password on its own is no longer enough to sign in. The BSI explicitly recommends two-factor authentication for privileged accounts and remote access.

Removable media only after approval

USB sticks and external drives only work on workstations once someone has checked and approved them.

This case confirmed my view on the subject: whether a company gets attacked and loses data one way or another is hardly the question. The question is when it happens and how well prepared you are. My impression is that too few people realise how serious this is. That is why I raise it openly with my clients.

Being prepared, to me, means a backup that an attacker cannot reach from the network, regular tests that you can actually restore from it, and a written order for bringing systems back. The BSI also advises practising the recovery of business-critical systems at regular intervals. It also means having the phone numbers of your insurer and the police to hand, not hunting for them once the computers are encrypted. You can read how I put this into practice in ongoing support under IT security and IT support.

Frequently asked questions

Should you pay the ransom after a ransomware attack?

In this case it was not necessary, because an intact offline backup existed. In general, paying does not guarantee that you receive a working key, as the BSI also points out. The better protection is a backup the attacker cannot reach.

How long does recovery after a ransomware attack take?

That depends on the size of the environment and the state of the backups. In the case described here, with 60 employees, the company was able to work again after 48 hours. Setting up the workstations again takes the most time.

Whom do you need to inform after a ransomware attack?

Your cyber insurer, if you have one, and the police. In Germany, businesses contact the central cybercrime contact point of their federal state. If personal data is affected, a report to the data protection authority within 72 hours may be required. Management should clarify with its data protection officer whether that applies.

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